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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Walter L. Barrows
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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning meeting on 20 September reached consensus on the following issues.

2. Warning Notes.

- Despite rumors of coup plotting in Sudan and steadily mounting pressures on the Sadiq regime, the military is reluctant to assume the burden of rule. Emergence of unrest and public protest by the middle class, however, would signal serious problems for the regime and could provoke a military coup. Fighting between government forces and southern rebels is likely to intensify in the near term as the rainy season ends. Passage of Sharia law by the Constituent Assembly would be divisive for the ruling coalition and also a severe setback to peace prospects. (paragraph 4)
- The situation in Burundi remains volatile. Intra-Tutsi feuding inhibits President Buyoya's ability to pursue reconciliation with fearful Hutus. Prospects for Tutsi-led violence will remain high because of unsatisfied desires for revenge. There is an even chance of a coup by Tutsi hardliners for at least the next 90 days. Prospects for Hutu-led violence are low. (paragraph 5)
- Although President Siad is unlikely for now to tolerate Libyan terrorist activities or threats to US interests, Somalia's rapprochement with Libya bears close watching. Siad is increasingly desperate for economic and military assistance, and Qadhafi probably would seek to exploit any opportunity to deal a setback to US influence, including by increasing military supplies to Somalia. (paragraph 6)

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- The status of the OPEX program in Liberia is of continuing concern, but President Doe probably will renew his active support to keep the program on track. (paragraph 7)
- Ivory Coast President Houphouet has improved prospects for a stable succession by designating National Assembly President Bedie as his successor. Economic reform is not high on Houphoet's personal agenda, however, and mounting economic difficulties could complicate Bedie's prospects by making non-Baoule more restive about continued Baoule rule. (paragraph 8)
- Senegal's President Diouf has yet to demonstrate strong leadership on controversial political and economic reforms, although he has successfully kept the opposition off balance. Cabinet changes anticipated imminently will be a test of his ability to develop greater consensus and support within his ruling Socialist Party. (paragraph 9)

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4. Sudan: Potential for Instability. DIA led the discussion.

- Sudan faces a long, expensive period of recovery in the wake of floods. Incompetence and corruption in the handling of relief has caused significant political damage. The capital is rife with rumors of coup plotting, largely attributed to mid-level military officers. Defense Minister Khalil is a strong figure, however, and an obstacle to any coup. Moreover, the military remains reluctant to assume the daunting burdens of rule, although emergence of significant middle class unrest could provoke a military coup. Sadiq is likely to be responsive to middle class concerns.
 - Sadiq's courting of Libyan economic support has strained the ruling coalition. The announcement of planned Libyan-Sudanese unity has been especially controversial, but unification is unlikely. A more immediate source of domestic friction is the possible passage of Sharia law by the Constituent Assembly. This would deal a severe setback to peace prospects by undermining the DUP's position as an intermediary between the ruling coalition and the SPLA, and by stiffening the rebels' commitment to their military campaign. Fighting in the south is likely to intensify soon as both sides maneuver for advantage at the end of the rainy season.
5. Burundi: Is the Worst Over? Presented by DIA.
- The situation has calmed significantly in recent weeks but remains volatile because of Hutu fear of retribution and Tutsi paranoia. The initial violence probably was Hutu-led, possibly stimulated by outside Hutu agitators as well as Tutsi moves to control coffee smuggling on the Rwanda border. Best estimates indicate about 3000 Tutsi deaths and an equal number of Hutu killed by the Tutsi-dominated army. Additional Hutu--perhaps many hundreds--probably died from exposure and disease as they fled the violence.
 - Intra-Tutsi feuding inhibits President Buyoya's pursuit of reconciliation. There is little he can do in the near term to restore Hutu confidence other than concentrate on the key task of restraining Tutsi desires for retribution. Prospects for Tutsi-led violence are high, and there is an even chance that hardline Tutsis will attempt a coup within the next 90 days. Buyoya probably has strengthened his position, however, by retreating from plans to invite international investigation of the causes of the violence, although this has created friction with aid donors. Additional Hutu-inspired violence is very unlikely.

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- The presence of up to 60,000 Hutu refugees in Rwanda risks stimulating Hutu nationalist feelings and fears regarding the Tutsi minority there. Rwanda and Zaire want stability restored in Burundi, but have little influence. There are no signs of external involvement, but former President Bagaza, in exile in Uganda, is a potential threat to Buyoya because of his remaining support within the Burundi military.
6. Somalia: Looking to Libya. Topic introduced by State/INR.
- Libyan deliveries of military supplies and other signs of rapprochement with Somalia probably stem from Siad's desperation for economic and military assistance as the war against northern insurgents drags on. Siad views US assistance as inadequate and has had little success elsewhere. Qadhafi probably is motivated by the opportunity to exploit an opening, to further break out of his diplomatic isolation, and to annoy the United States. The recent creation of a joint Libyan-Somali investment company offers a possible cover for Libyan operatives, but Siad is likely to watch the Libyans closely for now and not tolerate terrorist or anti-US activities. Qadhafi probably would be willing to increase his role as a military supplier if he saw the chance to deal a setback to the United States.
7. Liberia: Threats to Regime. CIA/ALA led the discussion.
- Most sources of domestic discontent are fading. The rice shortage is essentially over except for a 7-to-10 day gap before remaining US deliveries arrive. Some student protest has continued but is unlikely to escalate; Doe has kept the military out and there is no spillover to the general population. Opposition parties are weak and in decline. The public is politically passive. Although press opposition could resume, it is subdued for now by government banning and cooptation. Presidential security units appear loyal to Doe, but his support in the military is uncertain. Doe probably will avoid a public trial of surviving dissidents from the recent Podier coup attempt whose testimony would embarrass the regime. Defendants, including two US citizens, are likely to be released eventually.
 - Doe perceives a constant threat from Liberian dissidents in neighboring states, with some justification. These groups had been laying low since the Podier affair, but are now showing signs of renewed activity. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] The most complicated issue facing Doe is economic reform and the status of the OPEX program.

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Although progress was better than expected in the first six months, continued corruption and extra-budgetary spending have stalled the program in recent months. Doe probably will respond to US pressure to reinforce his support for OPEX because he lacks alternatives to US aid.

8. Ivory Coast: Succession Maneuvering. Introduced by CIA/ALA.

- Houphouet's private designation of Bedie as his successor enhances prospects for a stable succession. Baoule probably will rally behind Bedie to maintain their political control. Non-Baoule may begin to maneuver against Bedie as his selection becomes known, but not aggressively because of Houphouet's intolerance of public politicking. Bedie will avoid assuming too high a profile that would risk provoking Houphouet to reconsider his choice.
- Houphouet's other recent moves, such as reconciling with dissidents and pardoning teachers' union protesters, suggest he may be tying up loose ends in preparation for the end of his rule. Economic policy is not high on his agenda, however, and mounting economic problems could complicate Bedie's succession prospects by galvanizing non-Baoule resistance to continued Baoule rule.

9. Senegal: Mounting Pressures. Topic presented by CIA/ALA.

- Diouf faces a trade-off between economic reform and political stability, and has failed so far to engage in effective consensus politics to consolidate his support in the ruling Socialist Party and push reform. Cabinet changes expected soon and the possible departure of Presidential adviser Collin offer Diouf an opportunity to demonstrate stronger leadership within the party. Although he enjoys strong rural backing from Brotherhood leaders who support economic and political reform, he has been unable to convert this to political advantage against party hardliners.
- Although Diouf has kept opposition parties divided over tactics toward his round table political talks and apparently is maneuvering to coopt opposition leader Wade with a senior position, continued Socialist Party opposition to electoral reforms could galvanize the opposition in municipal elections next year. Diouf faces declining support in urban areas. Although some confrontations have been defused recently, such as with secondary students and police, a strike by health workers and problems with university students continue. The resolution of border land disputes with Mauritania also remains a potential source of domestic Toucouleur dissatisfaction and friction with Nouakchott.



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